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n January 9, 2007, the U.S. Supreme
Court decided a case that will have
sweeping implications for patent
licensing and technology transfer. In
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the
Court held that a patent licensee could seek
in federal court a declaratory judgment that
the licensed patent was invalid, unenforceable, or not infringed, without having first to
breach the license agreement. In this
regard, the patent licensee’s continued payment of royalties under the agreement does
not negate the existence of an actual controversy for purposes of U.S. Constitution
Article III jurisdiction. This follows because
of the potential consequence that, absent
such payment, the licensor would file suit
seeking enhanced damages for willful
patent infringement as well as an injunction
prohibiting the licensee from making and
selling its product.

THE LICENSE AND THE LAWSUIT
Genentech, Inc. and the City of Hope
own U.S. Patent No. 4,816,567 (the Cabilly
I patent), and U.S. Patent No. 6,331,415
(the Cabilly II patent), a continuation of
Cabilly I, that issued on December 18,
2001, after a lengthy interference proceed8

ing. The patented technology related to the
use of cell cultures to manufacture human
antibodies. Since 1997, MedImmune had
been licensed by Genentech under the
Cabilly I patent and, by the terms of that
agreement, received a license under the
Cabilly II patent. After the Cabilly II patent
issued, Genentech advised MedImmune
that a MedImmune product, marketed as
Synagis®, was covered by the Cabilly II
patent, and thus, subject to royalties in
accordance with the license terms.
MedImmune objected, and filed a declaratory judgment action in the U.S. District
Court for the Central District of California,
seeking a declaration that the Cabilly II
patent was invalid or unenforceable.
MedImmune continued to pay license royalties (albeit under protest) to Genentech,
relying on case law that a licensor may not
terminate the license if the royalties are
paid to the licensor and the license agreement is not otherwise breached. The district court dismissed MedImmune’s suit as
non-justiciable under the Declaratory
Judgment Act.
On appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit reiterated that while a
licensor and licensee always have adverse
legal interests, that relationship alone does
not create a justiciable controversy. Citing
Supreme Court precedent, the Federal
Circuit admonished that the Declaratory
Judgment Act requires a definite and concrete controversy of sufficient immediacy
and reality to warrant judicial intervention.
According to the Federal Circuit,
MedImmune avoided, and continued to
avoid, such a situation by avoiding breach
and avoiding apprehension of suit. The
Federal Circuit further reasoned that
although courts have discretion in deciding
whether to accept a declaratory action when
the constitutional and statutory requirements are met, there is no discretion to
accept an action when there is no controversy of immediacy or reality because there
is no reasonable apprehension of suit. The
Federal Circuit therefore held that the disINTELLECTUAL PROPERTY TODAY
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trict court did not err in finding that
MedImmune, since under no threat or
apprehension of suit, did not have standing
to bring a declaratory challenge to the
Cabilly II patent.

THE SUPREMES SEACHANGE
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to
hear MedImmune’s appeal. At oral argument, the justices appeared less than settled
about the nature of the applicable case-orcontroversy standard. Indeed, in the subsequent opinion, Justice Scalia, writing for the
8-1 majority, acknowledged that the Court
had not drawn the brightest of lines between
those declaratory-judgment actions that satisfy the case-or-controversy requirement
and those that do not. Nevertheless, the
precedent established that the dispute be
definite and concrete, touching the legal
relations of parties having adverse legal
interests, and that it be real and substantial
and admit of specific relief through a decree
of a conclusive character, as distinguished
from an opinion advising what the law
would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.
At bottom, the question in each case is
whether the facts alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse
legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and
reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory judgment.
The Court indicated that these standards undoubtedly would have been satisfied if MedImmune had taken the final step
of refusing to make royalty payments under
the 1997 license agreement. Whereas
Genentech claimed a right to royalties
under
the
licensing
agreement,
MedImmune asserted that no royalties were
owed because the Cabilly II patent was
invalid and not infringed. Moreover, it was
undisputed that Genentech had threatened
to enjoin MedImmune’s sales if royalties
were not forthcoming. In the Court’s view,
the factual and legal dimensions of the dispute were well defined. But for
MedImmune continuing to make royalty
payments, nothing about the dispute rendered it unfit for judicial resolution, opined
the Court. Assuming (without deciding)
that Genentech could not claim an anticipatory breach and repudiate the license,
the Court reasoned that the continuation of
royalty payments made what would otherwise be an imminent threat at least remote,
if not nonexistent. In this regard,
MedImmune’s own acts eliminated the

imminent threat of harm. The question,
therefore, was whether this caused the dispute no longer to be a case or controversy
within the meaning of Article III.
The Court analogized the case to others
where threatened action by the government
was concerned. In such cases, a plaintiff
would not be required to expose itself to liability before bringing suit to challenge the
basis for the threat, for example, the constitutionality of a law threatened to be
enforced. The plaintiff’s own action (or
inaction) in failing to violate the law eliminates the imminent threat of prosecution,
but nonetheless does not eliminate Article
III jurisdiction. The Court reasoned that
this did not preclude subject-matter jurisdiction because the threat-eliminating
behavior was effectively coerced. The
dilemma posed by that coercion – putting
the challenger to the choice between abandoning its rights or risking prosecution –
was the dilemma that it was the very purpose of the Declaratory Judgment Act to
ameliorate.
Furthermore, the Court stated that
promising to pay royalties on patents that
have not been held invalid does not amount
to a promise not to seek a holding of their
invalidity. The Court noted that despite
Genentech’s contention of the common-law
rule that a party to a contract cannot at one
and the same time challenge its validity
and continue to reap its benefits,
MedImmune was not repudiating or
impugning the contract while continuing to
reap its benefits. Rather, MedImmune was

asserting that the contract, properly interpreted, did not prevent it from challenging
the patent, and did not require the payment
of royalties because the patent did not
cover its product and was invalid.
Accordingly, the Court reversed the Federal
Circuit’s decision, which upheld the district court’s dismissal of MedImmune
declaratory judgment suit, and remanded
for a consideration of MedImmune’s invalidity and noninfringement arguments.

CHARTING A NEW COURSE?
An initial reaction to the MedImmune
decision might be to question the effect on
innovation and business generally. The
answer, however, will likely be mixed and
depends upon the particular industry sector
and its licensing customs. For example, the
biotechnology industry, with a greater
reliance upon patent licensing to facilitate
collaboration and to obtain access to
enabling technology, might suffer more
from a fear of licensee challenge.
In any event, with its judgment in
MedImmune, the Supreme Court has placed
licensed U.S. patents in greater jeopardy of
challenge by existing licensees, and has
instigated the adoption by future licensors
of contract provisions expressly designed to
thwart such licensee behavior. The procedural ability after MedImmune of a licensee
to avail itself of a declaratory judgment suit
in an advantageous forum will likely result
in an increased incidence of licensee challenges on presently licensed patents.
Particularly without the risk of injunction

and enhanced infringement damages, a
licensee would be emboldened to attempt to
step out from under the patent license or at
least to pursue leverage to renegotiate the
license for more favorable terms. In this
regard, the MedImmune decision might
have the unintended consequence of creating a federal court mechanism for what
essentially amounts to a post-grant opposition to an issued patent by a competitor
with the benefit of access to the patented
technology but without the fear of reprisal
for challenging the patent. Whether such
an impact on otherwise defined business
relationships involving patent rights is
acceptable might warrant a legislative consideration and response.
Of course, future licensors in the postMedImmune era might be encouraged to
seek lump-sum, paid-up or other frontloaded royalties. In the alternative, licensors will be motivated to exact contract
provisions that deter licensees from such
challenges, subject to the Lear v. Adkins
prohibition against estopping patent
licensees from raising invalidity contentions. License provisions that might
pass Lear muster include procedural
impediments, such as mandatory arbitration, as well as substantive costs, such as
increased royalties, associated with the
right to challenge the propriety of the
underlying patent. In any event, the feasibility of such contract limitations will
likely require yet another consideration by
the Supreme Court. IPT

Patent Office Asked to Review and Revoke Blackboard Patent
Software Freedom Law Center Files Re-Examination Request on Behalf of Clients
The Software Freedom Law Center (SFLC), provider of pro-bono legal services to protect and advance Free and Open Source
Software, has filed a formal request with the United States Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) for re-examination of
Blackboard’s e-Learning patent. If successful, the request will ultimately lead to the cancellation of all 44 claims of the patent.
Blackboard, Inc., maker of web-based software that allows teachers and students to interact outside of the classroom, was
awarded the patent on January 17, 2006. The patent, “Internet-based education support system and methods” (U.S. 6988138),
grants Blackboard a monopoly on most educational software that differentiates between the roles of teacher and student until the
year 2022.
The Software Freedom Law Center filed the re-examination request on behalf of Sakai, Moodle and ATutor, three open source
educational software programs. The request cites documents that predate the filing of the Blackboard patent and describe everything claimed in it. For a patent to be valid, it must contain ideas that were original when it was filed.
“In a free society, there is no room for a monopoly on any part of the educational process,” said Eben Moglen, Executive Director
of SFLC and Professor of Law and Legal History at Columbia University. “We are confident that there is enough prior art for the
Patent Office to open, re-examine, and ultimately revoke all of the patent’s claims.”
The Software Freedom Law Center filed the request for re-examination on November 17. The Patent Office will decide whether
to order re-examination of the patent within three months.
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